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IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AND TERRORISM

"WHY DO THEY HATE US?"
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought home to all Americans the fact that there are dangerous terrorist groups at work in the world, some with an intensely anti-American agenda. Public reaction was summed up in the question, "Why do they hate us?" The question may have been meant by some to refer only to the individuals who planned and executed the attacks, but to a certain extent it came to refer to the presumption that the U.S. was widely hated in the Arab and Muslim world, and that this hatred was the source of the terrorism inflicted upon the United States that day. Since the September 11 attacks, regional experts and pundits have discussed at length in journals, newspapers and the broadcast media their theories about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism in the Arab and Muslim world. Based upon their theories, they make policy recommendations. Separately, a number of polling organizations have conducted surveys of opinion in the Arab and Muslim world, in order to provide some understanding of broader public opinion about the United States and the lives of the residents of those countries that could be useful to those attempting to understand the reasons for the September 11 attacks. Finally, U.S. policy actions and documents released since then, while focusing mainly on defeating the specific terrorist groups, implicitly agree that in order to stop terrorism, the U.S. must look for its sources, and address the problems that are presumed to give rise to terrorism. Among these have been public diplomacy campaigns to improve the image of the United States in the Muslim world, along with discussion of assistance programs to countries such as Afghanistan whose lack of development and stability made it easy sanctuary for terrorism. But while there has been some effort to put together the thinking by experts and pundits, the results of opinion polls, and strategies put forth by Administration officials, there are potential lessons to be learned from the polls in particular, especially when opinions in the Muslim and Arab world are compared to those in other regions. This paper will examine some of the most prominent theories by regional experts and pundits about the sources of antiAmericanism and terrorism, and the link between the two, and at three major opinion polls conducted in 2002 that shed light on public opinion about the issues, and attempt to draw conclusions about some of the theories based on the polls. Finally it will look at where current U.S. policy comes down on the issue, and make some suggestions about areas for consideration by policy makers regarding United States efforts to get to the sources of terrorism and anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world.
DIVIDED VIEWS AMONG PUNDITS AND ACADEMICS INFORMING U.S. POLICY
Since before September 11, regional experts have been attempting to explain the rise of anti-United States terrorist organizations in the region. In the process, most describe widespread criticism and antipathy toward the United States. While these observers differ considerably on those sources, they mostly agree that there is a direct and sometimes even causal link between anti-Americanism and terrorism.
For many, the issue was on the table long before September 11. At the time of the attacks, Bernard Lewis, a leading American scholar of the Middle East, was finalizing a book asking What Went Wrong? in the Arab and Islamic world.
1 Although he points out that the book was written just before the attacks, the way he frames his look at the Arab world presumes a link between what he sees as centuries long cultural, economic, and political decline in the Arab world and the terrorism that struck September 11. He emphasizes that the question is not just of interest to Westerners. "People in the Islamic world, especially but not exclusively in the Middle East," have been wondering why the Islamic world, once "in the forefront of human civilization and achievement," 2 controlling vast swaths of territory, had lost so much power and prestige over the last several hundred years. world's problems in its treatment of women, lack of a notion of secular state, lack of "sense of time," and lack of real social equality. Lewis' view of an entire culture that has fallen behind as the rest of the world modernizes offers little prescription for combating anti-Americanism or terrorism. 3 He sees the solution as totally in the hands of the Arabs themselves, saying "If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in a common creative endeavor, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own." Those who can't turn to the mosque and Islam to protest. The regimes crush the violent Muslim protesters, but to avoid being accused of being anti-Muslim, the regimes give money and free rein to their most hard-line, but non-violent, Muslim clerics, while also redirecting their publics'
anger onto America through their press."
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Friedman also sees the experience of those who migrate to Europe as a context that leads some to anti-Western terrorism. He points to the fact that many of the hijackers and others arrested for terrorism were radicalized by the social dislocation they experienced in first growing up in a world which did nothing to prepare them for modern life, and then moving to Europe, where they did not fit in, and where they gravitated toward radical Islam. "What radicalized the September 11 terrorists was not that they suffered from a poverty of food, it was that they suffered from a poverty of dignity. 17 Friedman argues that the U.S. must pressure Arab regimes to change, and has argued in favor of a U.S. war against Iraq in part so that we can install a democracy that will serve as a liberating example to the region.
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Friedman sees anti-Americanism coming in part from U.S. policies. He notes that many observers express the fear that increased democracy in the region could undermine the pro-U.S. and relatively modernist regimes in place. He argues, however, that "the pro-Americanism of these Arab leaders is being bought at a price of keeping their own people so angry, so without voice, and so frustrated by corruption that they are enraged at both their regimes and for religion or nationality. 29 Among its key questions, the poll asked respondents to rank a list of issues in order of personal importance (ranging from health care to marriage to political issues), a list of values children should be taught, and a list of political issues. Pollsters also asked respondents whether they were better or worse off than they had been four years ago, than they thought they would be in four years, than their parents had been at their age, and than their children would be. They were also asked whether they thought favorably or unfavorably of a list of non-Arab countries, including the United States, and were asked an open-ended question about how the United States could improve its image in the Arab world. In its summaries and press presentation, Zogby focused on the fact that the respondents, like people all over the world, generally ranked personal issues higher than political issues, that they ranked concern over Palestinian issues relatively high, and that they professed to be relatively optimistic about the future. thought most important to teach to children, and whether respondents were optimistic or pessimistic about the future. Gallup launched the report with a major press roll-out.
Newspapers such as USA Today which covered the poll highlighted the fact that large majorities of respondents did not believe that Arabs had been responsible for the September 11 attacks.
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At least one commentator criticized Gallup for sensationalizing the number of respondents who expressed unfavorable views of the United States, and for failing to distinguish between citizens and residents of countries such as Kuwait, where non-Kuwaiti guest workers make up more than half the population. people in 44 countries in every region of the world. 34 In its press release of the report, Pew said that the image of the U.S has been "tarnished" around the world since the September 11
attacks, but that opinions about the U.S. are "complicated and contradictory." 35 The Pew survey asked respondents whether they had a favorable or unfavorable view of the United States, whether they thought the United States takes their country's interests into account in formulating foreign policy, whether they supported the United States' goals in the war on terrorism, and whether they admired various aspects of American culture. The survey asked respondents about their quality of life and outlook for the future. It also asked their level of satisfaction with their state of their country, how well their government was handling their countries problems, and which problems among a list of ten provided were of greatest concern in their country.
The Pew survey showed high levels of negative sentiment against the United States around the world, particularly in the Middle East, and some negative attitudes about aspects of U.S. culture in every region, including among residents of some close American allies. It showed opposition to the U.S.-led war on terrorism in most of the predominantly-Muslim countries surveyed, and showed that most respondents around the world, including Western
Europe and the Middle East, but also in Canada and other friendly countries, believe the United
States "does not take into account the interests of [the respondent's] country when making international policies.
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One difficulty in drawing conclusions from the polls is censorship. Each of the polls' authors made clear that in certain countries the pollsters had to clear questions with governments. While he did not refer directly to censorship, in his note on methodology, Zogby stated that opinion polling was not well-developed in the Arab world, but added "Progress is being made. We even found a greater willingness on the part of the government authorities to support more inquiry into these topics." 37 Gallup and Pew specified that certain governments had prevented them from asking certain questions. Gallup noted that the idea of poll-taking in the region is difficult in part because of censorship. It cleared the poll questions with local officials, and made "minor adjustments" when local officials so requested. The report introduction states that Gallup's Middle Eastern research partners "knew it would be impossible to address the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks directly-in a region where speech tends to be more heavily regulated, local governments would never allow such questions to be asked outright." Gallup's questions about September 11 were limited and they were not permitted to ask these questions or questions about U.S. actions in Afghanistan in Jordan and Egypt. 38 Gallup further noted that it phrased its questions in ways that would be most likely to pass the censors. Its questions "focused on the respondents' worldview," and so it was "…able to couch indirect questions about terrorism and the West in a more innocuous context." 39 The Pew Trust noted that "In some countries, official government permission needed to be granted in order to proceed and, in some cases, certain questions could not be asked. We did not alter the questionnaire to gain permission, but were required to omit a significant number of questions in China, Vietnam, and Egypt." The excluded questions included those asking about satisfaction with the performance of the government and whether or not the respondent approved of suicide bombing. The Gallup Poll also registered significant numbers of respondents who said they had a "mostly" or "very" unfavorable view of the United States. Lebanese respondents were evenly divided with 41% having a favorable view of the U.S., 40% negative, and 19% saying "neither."
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U.S. VIEWED UNFAVORABLY IN ARAB/MUSLIM WORLD-AND ELSEWHERE
In Turkey the numbers were 40% favorable, 33% unfavorable, and 25% neither. Kuwait respondents had a 28% favorable, 41% unfavorable, and 31% neither response. In Jordan, only 22% had a favorable view, with 62% having an unfavorable view, and 16% saying "neither."
Numbers were similar in Morocco, with 22% having a favorable view, 41% unfavorable, and 19% saying "neither." In Saudi Arabia, only 16% had a favorable view, 64% unfavorable, and 19% said "neither." Numbers were almost identical in Iran, with 14% having a favorable view, 63% unfavorable, and 14% saying "neither." Pakistan was the lowest, with only nine percent having a favorable view, 68% unfavorable, and 23% saying "neither."
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Gallup also asked respondents about their views of "the West" in general, asking "How positively or negatively do you think our own value system is being influenced by the value system that prevails in the Western societies?" In several countries, a majority (Saudi Arabia (53%), Lebanon (62%), Morocco (67%), and Jordan (74%)) said Western societies had a "somewhat" or "very" negative influence on their own culture. In the other countries less than half saw the influence as negative, but in no country did more than 26% (this in Kuwait) see the influence as "somewhat" or "very" positive. Many respondents said the influence was "neither." 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD AMERICANS
All three polls tried to test whether there was any difference in respondents' attitudes toward Americans versus the United States, with mixed results. In the case of the Zogby and Pew surveys, the poll reports made reference to previous polling data to buttress their conclusions.
Zogby noted that he "found in an earlier study conducted by Zogby International in April of 2002, Arab unfavorable attitudes towards the United States are a function of U.S. policy toward the Arab world. In that study, entitled Impressions of America, we found that Arabs who were polled in five Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon and UAE) had strong favorable attitudes toward American "Science and Technology," "Freedom and Democracy," "Education," "movies and Television," and also had largely favorable attitudes toward the American people. However they had extremely negative attitudes toward U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Arab world, Iraq and most especially toward Palestine." Zogby's conclusion is that it Arab anger is over U.S. policies and that there is not generalized hatred of the U.S. Gallup's 2002 Islamic study." 62 Gallup argued that the data could not definitively answer the question of "How much does the Palestinian-Israeli conflict factor in fostering residents' negative views of the West-and in particular, of the United States," but that the study provides insights.
More than 80% of respondents in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Saudi Arabia said they had recently been following "news about Palestine" on the television. Far fewer respondents in the non-Arab countries, ranging from 16% in Indonesia to 41% in Turkey (and including 27% in Iran and 34% in Pakistan) said their attention had been attracted by TV news about the issue.
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There was a similar distinction between Arab and non-Arab states in terms of the frequency with which respondents said they had followed the news about Palestine, with significant majorities in Turkey (62%), Pakistan (77%), Iran (77%), and Indonesia (92%) saying they followed the issue "hardly" or "not at all, while similarly large percentages of respondents in Arab countries said they followed the news about Palestine "very frequently." 
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IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONS ON SUPPORT FOR WAR ON TERRORISM
Only the Gallup and Pew surveys directly addressed the issue of the September 11 attacks or the war on terrorism, and both revealed lopsided opinions that indicate low U.S.
credibility on these issues in the region. The conclusions do not say much about the sources of anti-Americanism, but do reveal a high level of mistrust. IN addition, the survey results do not provide insight into the sources of terrorism, but do reveal difficulties the U.S. has in convincing residents of the Middle East (and some other regions) terrorism should be the top issue of concern.
The Gallup Poll asked two questions related to September 11. The first was, "According to news reports, groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the USA on September 11. Do you believe this to be true or not." In almost every country the majority answered that they believed it was "not true" that Arabs had carried out the attack. Eighty-nine percent of Kuwaitis, 
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Gallup also asked respondents whether they thought the September 11 attacks were "morally justifiable." Most respondents (ranging from 61% in Pakistan to 84% in Indonesia), except in Kuwait, found the September 11 attacks mostly or totally "morally unjustifiable." 69 In
Kuwait only 36% found the attacks unjustifiable, while 36% said they were justifiable, and 26%, the highest level of non-respondents, said they were "neither." Unfortunately Gallup provided no insight into the relationship between the two questions. It would be useful, to see the correlation between those who believed Arabs were responsible for the attack and those who believe the attacks were justified. 70 What Gallup offers is tantalizing, but contributes little to understanding what link, if any, there is between generalized anti-Americanism and terrorism, except perhaps a tacit sense that grievances are strong enough to justify terrorism.
Pew asked respondents around the world whether they supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism. "There is broad support for the U.S. goal of combating terrorism, with the notable exception of those countries in the Middle East/Conflict Area. Yet there is an equally strong global consensus that the United States disregards the views of others in carrying out its foreign policy. In the Middle East, except in Uzbekistan, respondents opposed the war on terrorism and said they did not think the U.S. takes other countries into consideration in formulating policy.
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In Egypt and Jordan opposition to the war on terrorism ran high (79% and 85% respectively opposed it.
In other parts of the world, large majorities supported the war on terrorism, but believed the United States did not take other countries into consideration when formulating policy. 72 For example, 68% of Canadians supported the war on terrorism, but 73% said they did not think U.S. foreign policy takes into consideration the views of others. Of all the West and East Europe countries, high majorities supported the war on terrorism, but only in Germany did a majority of respondents think the U.S. considered the views of others in formulating its foreign policy.
73 Support for the war on terror in Latin America was a bit more divided, but where antiAmericanism ran highest-in Argentina-support was lowest. South Koreans responded more like residents of the Middle East, with 72% saying they oppose the war on terror and 73% saying they do not think the U.S. takes the views of others into consideration when formulating foreign policy. 74 Even largely Muslim Indonesia and Bangladesh are not so opposed to the war on terror. In sub-Saharan Africa, majorities supported the war on terror except in predominantly
Muslim Mali (where only 47% supported it) and Senegal (where only 32% supported it).
Opinion in most countries was more divided than elsewhere about U.S. unilateralism, with majorities in six countries (Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, and South Africa) saying they believe the U.S. takes their country into consideration in foreign policy. "As is true in many other countries with sizable Muslim populations, Muslims in Nigeria and Senegal are less supportive than non-Muslims of the U.S.-led fight against terrorism.
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ANGER AT THEIR REGIMES OR JEALOUSY OF OUR SYSTEM
The polls provide some insight into the theories that anti-Americanism is fueled by widespread dissatisfaction in the region and jealousy of the United States. They provide less insight into respondents' attitudes toward their own regimes, especially given censorship of some questions in some countries. The polls do not provide any insight in whether these problems are at the source of terrorism originating from the region.
In the Zogby poll, respondents were asked to "state to personal importance of a number of political issues" (listed as "Palestine, the rights of the Palestinian people, 'your civil and personal rights,' the general Arab situation, relations with non-Arab countries, health care, personal economic situation, the economy of 'your country,' that 'your country' is changing to meet challenges, and moral standards." 76 As Zogby notes, "without question, 'civil and personal rights' earned the overall highest priority rating given to any political issue." 77 It ranked number one cumulatively, and ranked number one or two in every country except Saudi Arabia, where it ranked number three. Unfortunately, Zogby did not further examine this result, stating only "The extremely high rating given to civil and personal rights speaks for itself."
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Pew was the only poll to ask respondents their opinions of national governments, and the responses do not set Middle Eastern countries apart from countries in other regions.
Pollsters asked respondents to rate their national institutions. When asked to state which institutions (the military, the national government, the news media, and religious leaders) had a "good influence" on the country, many around the world ranked the military and the press very high. 79 (The question was not allowed in Egypt.) The responses in the Middle East correlated strongly with those in other regions, including the U.S. and Canada, but Pew warns that "People in countries with authoritarian regimes give their leaders…the high marks that might be expected for heads of governments that brook little opposition."
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For those analysts who see pessimism and despair as the source of anti-Americanism and especially of terrorism, the polls raise some questions. In the Zogby poll, pollsters asked respondents whether they were better off or worse off now than four years ago; whether they felt that four years from now their situation would be better or worse; whether they were better off today or worse off than their parents were at the their age; and whether they felt that their children would be better off or worse off than they are. Zogby reports that the overall data shows that, except in Lebanon, "respondents indicate that they are more or less satisfied with their current situation and solidly optimistic about their longer-term prospects." 81 Regarding individual countries, the majority of respondents saw themselves better off now than four years ago in all except Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. Everywhere except in Lebanon and Israel respondents said they believed they would be better off in four years. In all but Lebanon and Saudi Arabia they saw themselves as better off than their parents were at the same age. In all but Lebanon most respondents said they believe that their children will be off than they are now.
The Gallup Poll had similar outcomes on a similar set of questions. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of one to ten with regard to how they rated their overall personal situation now, five years ago, and five years from now. In every country except Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, respondents felt they were better off now than five years ago, and in every country except Lebanon and Turkey, respondents believed they would be better off in five years than they are now.
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The Pew Poll saw gloomier views of the world overall, but Middle Eastern respondents were no more pessimistic than counterparts around the world. Unlike the pattern in responses to questions about the United States, respondents in Middle Eastern countries did not stand out as significantly more pessimistic or critical than respondents in other regions of the world.
When asked whether they were satisfied with the state of their country, considerable majorities around the world, with few exceptions, responded that they were "dissatisfied." The Pew report The Strategy acknowledged the importance of examining the sources of terrorism both in describing the nature of the terrorist threat, and discussing how the U.S. will go about fighting terrorism. However, the language clearly saw "…underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife…" as "opportunities for terrorists to exploit," rather than conditions that cause terrorism or sources of terrorism. "The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem enabling terrorism to develop and grow."
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In outlining the third goal-"Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Finally, the Strategy says that the United States "will use effective, timely public diplomacy and government supported media to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspiration for freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism."
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The "Conclusion" provides a slightly nuanced discussion: "We will win the war of ideas and diminish the underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism." 99 "We strive to build an international order where more countries and people are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners-values such as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free economies, and religious tolerance. We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism."
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Overall U.S. strategy, as presented in the National Security Strategy (NSS), is consistent with the themes in the terrorism strategy document. The NSS also explicitly denied the link between poverty and terrorism, stating that "Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." 101 Like the terrorism strategy, the NSS acknowledges the importance of addressing underlying conditions. "In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror."
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CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT POLLS OFFER
The polls provide some useful information that can assist policy-makers in assessing the theories of regional experts about the sources of anti-Americanism and terrorism, but do not present as clear-cut an outlook as some would argue.
Whatever the source of anti-American sentiment, it is clearly a problem in the region, and should be of great concern. The clear concern about Palestinian issues may not be a source of either anti-Americanism or terrorism, but the fact that the situation remains unresolved and that the United States is widely perceived as biased will almost certainly impede efforts to build regional support for other key U.S. policy goals, including the war on terrorism. Some of these opinions may indicate the need for better public diplomacy to explain American actions, but it may be that the attitudes come from real differences of opinion over how to approach the situation, and frustration with the unresolved situation of Palestinians.
Secondly, policy makers should be concerned over doubts and disbelief about the identity of the September 11 terrorists and the lack of support in the region for the war on terrorism. These would seem to be symptoms of a greater problem-the lack of credibility of the United States in the region and the aggressively anti-American press in many countries, including some where the press is tightly controlled by the government. It would behoove policy makers to consider media campaigns by the United States to counter negative information from sources such as Hezbollah television, but also to test reactions to the way in which the United
States explains its policies and outlooks to ensure that these are presented in ways that are convincing to non-Americans. The fact that there are negative attitudes, even in friendly countries such as Canada, toward several aspects of American life and toward how the United
States conducts itself in the world makes this all the more important. As some experts have opined, it might also be necessary to keep up pressure on friendly governments to stop allowing their government controlled media to print obvious lies about the United States, and to allow greater overall freedom of press so that residents of their countries have greater access to a full range of world opinion.
The polls provide less insight into searches for the sources of terrorism. As described above, none of the polls shows a level of pessimism or social dislocation or dissatisfaction described by regional experts and commentators ranging from Lewis to Friedman to Zakaria.
The pessimism about global or national situations revealed in the polls is certainly not unique to the region, and there is no clear correlation between a country's level of development or social dislocation and anti-Americanism or terrorism. Part of this may be the fact that the polls did not (and maybe could not, given censorship) address directly attitudes toward terrorism (as opposed to attitudes toward the war on terrorism), but part of it may be that any analysis of the sources of terrorism, as opposed to the sources of anti-Americanism, may require a different approach, including analyses of the specific sources of discontent, the qualities of leadership, and the ideological goals of specific terrorist organizations.
The facts remain, however, that there is clearly strong sentiment against the United
States in a region which generated a well-organized and financed terrorist organization which has targeted and successfully attacked the United States. If policy-makers are to convince people in the region that the problem is serious and that we need their help in defeating it, they must take a good look at the sources of anti-American sentiment, including those actions by the United States that inadvertently create mistrust, and devise a plan for overcoming these sentiments.
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